This study investigated (1) whether potential future purchasing agents were predisposed to accept gratuities or whether the practice of gratuity acceptance is a manifestation of the job itself, (2) whether the existence of a code of ethics forbidding gratuity acceptance curtails the occurrence, and (3) whether disparities in ethics policies between the sales and purchasing functions affect gratuity acceptance. Hypotheses based upon the concepts of organizational concern and institutionalized ethics are developed and empirically tested. Results suggest that future purchasing agents (...) are predisposed to accept gratuities and that formal written ethics policies decrease the acceptance of gratuities. Disparities in ethics policies between the sales and purchasing functions concerning gratuities failed to affect gratuity acceptance significantly. (shrink)

This study examines the impact of Sarbanes–Oxley on the nonprofit sector. Focusing on three key SOX policies applicable to charities—conflict-of-interest policies, records retention policies, and whistleblower policies—this study tests the relationship between the existence and addition of these policies on subsequent ethical and governance lapses as reflected in the issuance of “donor advisories” by the large third-party ratings agency Charity Navigator. The findings suggest that, controlling for other relevant organizational factors, the three SOX-inspired written policies are related to a reduced (...) likelihood of donor advisories in the organizations rated by Charity Navigator. (shrink)

The ideas contained in Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies—one of the most important tracts in political philosophy in the twentieth century—are relevant to anyone seeking to understand the recent history of the East Asian economies. Even though Popper wrote his tract to provide an explanation for both the rise and objectionable nature of totalitarian regimes in Europe in the twentieth century, many of the arguments that he advanced in this European context also explain the social, political and (...) economic relationships that are seen in modern South Eastern Asian economies. The narrative of this book is driven by a research agenda that is inter-disciplinary in nature, since to make the link between the Popperian framework and East Asian socio-economic relationships the contributing authors needed to draw upon research fields as far apart as political philosophy and East-Asian studies. With one or two exceptions, however, nearly all of the contributing authors have a background in economics, and this background is reflected in the way that they have sought to tackle the research question. This book is, in short, an inter-disciplinary exercise undertaken from an economics perspective, and hence it may best be described as an exercise in political economy rather than pure analytical economics. The novelty of juxtaposing Popperian ideas with a discussion of social, political and economic development in South East Asia makes this narrative of interest to both political philosophers and specialists in South East Asian economies. The key insight drawn from the analysis is that although Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies was a product of a European time and place, it is also relevant to anyone seeking to understand the recent history of the East Asian economies. (shrink)

The nonlinear dynamical process of self-organized criticality provides a new that explains a number of unresolved anomalies: Why are the really big events in human history usually unpredictable? Why is it impossible to anticipate sudden political, economic, and social changes? Why do distributions of historical data almost always contain a few extreme events that seem to have had a different cause from all the rest? Why do so many of our fail to predict important future events? As people, organizations, and (...) nations become increasingly sensitive to each other's behavior, trivial occurrences sometimes propagate into sudden changes. Such events are unpredictable because in the self-organized criticality environment that characterizes human history, the magnitude of a cause often is unrelated to the magnitude of its effect. (shrink)

Offering more detailed explanatory notes than earlier versions, this edition reprints together for the first time all of Paine's introductions to the versions published in his lifetime. In his own richly informed Introduction, Claeys elucidates the historical context and the subsequent influence of Paine’s text, as well as the major problems in interpreting Paine’s theory. Instructors will find this new edition a worthy counterpoint to the Hackett edition of Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, edited by J. G. A. (...) Pocock. (shrink)

This paper describes the application of eight statistical and machine-learning methods to derive computer models for predicting mortality of hospital patients with pneumonia from their findings at initial presentation. The eight models were each constructed based on 9847 patient cases and they were each evaluated on 4352 additional cases. The primary evaluation metric was the error in predicted survival as a function of the fraction of patients predicted to survive. This metric is useful in assessing a model’s potential to assist (...) a clinician in deciding whether to treat a given patient in the hospital or at home. We examined the error rates of the models when predicting that a given fraction of patients will survive. We examined survival fractions between 0.1 and 0.6. Over this range, each model’s predictive error rate was within 1% of the error rate of every other model. When predicting that approximately 30°K of the patients will survive, all the models have an error rate of less than 1.5%. The models are distinguished more by the number of variables and parameters that they contain than by their error rates; these differences suggest which models may be the most amenable to future implementation as paper-based guidelines. (shrink)

Human neural and behavioral activities have been reported to exhibit fractal dynamics known as 1/f noise, which is more aptly named 1/f scaling. Some argue that 1/f scaling is a general and pervasive property of the dynamical substrate from which cognitive functions are formed. Others argue that it is an idiosyncratic property of domain‐specific processes. An experiment was conducted to investigate whether 1/f scaling pervades the intrinsic fluctuations of a spoken word. Ten participants each repeated the word bucket over 1,000 (...) times, and fluctuations in acoustic measurements across repetitions generally followed the 1/f scaling relation, including numerous parallel yet distinct series of 1/f fluctuations. On the basis of work showing that 1/f scaling is a universal earmark of metastability, it is proposed that the observed pervasiveness of 1/f fluctuations in speech reflects the fact that cognitive functions are formed as metastable patterns of activity in brain, body, and environment. (shrink)

During the postwar period, the concept of instinct came to encapsulate the debate around the importance of nature versus nurture. The fact that animals show highly organized behavior early in development suggested the presence of an underlying fixity where behavior was “inbuilt” into an animal’s biology despite an individual’s experiences. This placed a discrete and exhaustive line between the innate and acquired that became a foundation for the European-dominated field of ethology. Across the Atlantic, a group of comparative psychologists led (...) by the American Museum of Natural History’s T. C. Schneirla contested this approach, proposing that the study of animal behavior should avoid abstract dichotomies with a renewed focus on developmental processes. While Schneirla’s theoretical and empirical work shaped the modern study of animal behavior, his legacy requires revisiting in an era where the nature versus nurture debate is regaining prominence. In this article, I revisit Schneirla’s approach to behavior with a focus on his paper “Interrelationships of the ‘Innate’ and the ‘Acquired’ in Instinctive Behavior” (published in M. Autuori et al. (1956) _L’instinct dans le comportement des animaux et de l’homme_; Masson, Paris, pp. 387–452) for the journal’s “Classics in Biological Theory” collection; the paper is available as supplementary material in the online version of this article. A companion article (this issue; G. M. Kohn (2024) “A Discussion on Instinct, Paris, 1954”) presents the commentary that was published with it. (shrink)

For centuries, moral philosophers have attempted to clarify the relationship between morality and rational self-interest. They have been especially interested in the possibility that there are situations in which it is perceptibly against one’s interests to act morally, e.g., situations in which it clearly pays to lie, cheat, or steal. Hobbes, who held an egoistic view of human nature, was especially troubled by this possibility. For if psychological egoism is true and this possibility is a real one, there may be (...) situations in which people must act in a way that is either immoral or irrational. To avoid this unpalatable conclusion, Hobbes seeks to show that the aforementioned possibility is illusory, that no real conflict between morality and rational prudence can occur. (shrink)

Introduction: the paradox of Socrates, by G. Vlastos.--Our knowledge of Socrates, by A. R. Lacey.--Socrates in the Clouds, by K. J. Dover.--Elenchus, by R. Robinson.--Elenchus: direct and indirect, by R. Robinson.--Socratic definition, by R. Robinson.--Elenctic definitions, by G. Nakhnikian.--Socrates on the definition of piety: Euthyphro 10A-11B, by S. M. Cohen.--Socrates at work on virtue and knowledge in Plato's Laches, by G. Santas.--Virtues in action, by M. F. Burnyeat.--The Socratic denial of Akrasia, by J. J. Walsh.--Plato's Protagoras and explanations of weakness, (...) by G. Santas.--Socrates on disobeying the law, by A. D. Woozley.--Plato's earlier theory of forms, by R. E. Allen.--Selected bibliography (p. 336-339). (shrink)

This study is an extension of our recent ethics research in direct marketing and information technology. In this study, we investigated the relationships among core organizational values, organizational ethics, corporate social responsibility, and organizational performance outcome. Our analysis of online survey responses from a sample of IT professionals in the United States indicated that managers from organizations with organic core values reported a higher level of social responsibility relative to managers in organizations with mechanistic values; that managers in both mechanistic (...) and organic organizations which were perceived as more socially responsible were also perceived as more ethical; and that perceived ethical attitudes and social responsibility were significantly associated with organizational performance outcome measures. Our article discusses research premises, conceptual framework, hypotheses, research methodology, data analysis, recommendations for further research, and conclusions. (shrink)

Healey et al. use experiments with chat dialogues to test the hypothesis that language co‐ordination is driven by ‘running repairs’. They replace signals of understanding such as “okay” with weaker, ‘spoof’ signals like “ummm”, and replace specific requests for clarification like “on the left?” with signals that suggest a higher degree of misunderstanding like “what?”. The latter manipulation causes participants to switch rapidly to more abstract forms of referring expression.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:WORKS OF FICTION AND ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS by Gregory Currie ii O peech act theory is remarkably unhelpful in explaining what ficOtion is." So says Kendall Walton.1 My purpose here is to showjust how wrong diis judgment is. Not that I want to endorse all die attempts there have been to connect fiction with the notion of a speech act. Elsewhere I have argued diat the most prominent attempt (...) at such a theory, the one due to John Searle, fails.2 But my complaint is not mat Searle employs the idea of a speech act; rather it is that he employs it in too half-hearted a fashion. The idea of Searle and odiers is diat to write fiction is not to perform a speech act, but rather to pretend to do so. I, on the odier hand, take the view that the writer of fiction engages in an act of speech diat is distinctively fictional, and distinctively different from speech acts such as asserting, requesting, questioning, and so forth. What follows is a much simplified account of this idea.3 Following die program of Strawson and Grice, I believe diat the different kinds of speech acts are to be individuated in terms of the utterer's intentions.4 The intention of the one who asserts is to get a certain kind of response; perhaps to get the audience to believe the proposition asserted.5 The one who commands wants the audience to obey, die requester wants the audience to answer, etc. And in all these cases the utterer intends to get the response partly as a result of the audience's recognition of diat very intention. (This is the familiar Gricean mechanism.) The utterer of fiction, on the odier hand, wants to get the audience to make-believe die proposition uttered.6 Thus we have an act structurally similar to 304 Gregory Currie305 paradigmatic speech acts like asserting, commanding, and requesting (die structural similarity being given by the use in all cases of the Gricean intention ), but differing from diese odiers with respect to die content of the utterer's intention. Let us call such an act a.fictive illocutionary act. Pursuing this line in more detail leads to an intuitively satisfactory taxonomy of speech acts which places the uttering (usually writing) of fiction fully widiin die purview of the theory, rather dian shutting it off to one side as a pseudo-performance, as widi Searle. Is such a theory susceptible to the objections diat Walton brings? Walton is quite right to say (and here I suppose he has Searle in mind) that fiction is not simply the absence ofillocutionary force: "it is something positive, something special" (p. 79). As already indicated, my theory gives a positive account of fiction as a special kind of speech act. But Walton presses the issue further by suggesting that the essence of fiction has nodiing to do with die absence of assertive force. It is possible, he says, "to make an assertion by writing fiction." His point is not merely that fictional stories are sometimes told in order to get across some serious but not explicit point — everyone can agree to that. It is rather diat fictional works contain explicit assertions — e.g., some of Tolstoy's sentences about Napoleon in War and Peace — and that a fiction might contain nothing but assertions. He imagines a genre of historical fiction in which "authors are allowed no liberties with the facts, and in which they are understood to be asserting as fact whatever they write" (p. 80). Let us grant that this is a possibility. What, dien, would distinguish a piece of fiction belonging to this genre from, say, a work of historical scholarship? The answer comes when we see that the same utterance can be used to perform more than one illocutionary act. Thus if I say to someone "I have no money" it may be that I want him both to believe that I have no money and to give me the goods on credit. And in both cases I intend to get die desired responses via his recognition of my intentions. The same utterance can count both as an assertion... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:January 22, 2009 (8:41 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 28 (winter 2008–09): 127–42 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 YABLO’S PARADOX AND RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS Gregory Landini Philosophy / U. of Iowa Iowa City, ia 52242–1408, usa gregory[email protected] Is self-reference necessary for the production of Liar paradoxes? Yablo has given an argument that self-reference is not (...) necessary. He hopes to show that the indexical apparatus of self-reference of the traditional Liar paradox can be avoided by appealing to a list, a consecutive sequence, of sentences correlated one-one withnaturalnumbers.Yabloopens his “Paradox without Self-Reference” (Analysis, 1993) with the assumption that there is a sequence such that: Snz: “(;k)(k > n.!. True Sk)” Each sentence on Yablo’s list is supposed to be correlated one-one with number n. Each sentence is supposed to say that for every natural number kz greater than n, the k-th sentence on the list is not true. By comparing Yablo’s construction to an analogous construction with early Russellian propositions, we show that Yablo has failed to generate a paradox. 1. vicious circularity in yablo’s paradox S elf-reference has been taken to be the source of paradoxes. Poincaré and Russell are commonly associated with this thesis. In an amusing passage, the mathematician Jourdain recalls something of the dialogue between them: Nearly all mathematicians agreed that the way to solve these paradoxes was simply not to mention them; but there was some divergence of opinion as to how they were to be unmentioned. It was clearly unsatisfactory merely not to mention them. Thus Poincaré was apparently of the opinion that the best way of avoiding such awkward subjects was to mention that they were not to be mentioned. But [as Russell put it] “one might as well, in talking to a man with January 22, 2009 (8:41 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 128 gregory landini 1 Philip Jourdain, The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*llz (London: Allen & Unwin, 1918), p. 77. Russell is quoted from “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types” (1908), LK, p. 63. 2 “On ‘Insolubilia’ and Their Solution By Symbolic Logic”, in B. Russell, Essays in Analysis, ed. Douglas Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 196. 3 I believe that this is Russell’s view in 1906. See Gregory Landini, “Russell’s Separation of the Logical and Semantic Paradoxes”, Revue internationale de philosophie 58 (2004): 257–94 (issue titled “Russell en héritage / Le centenaire des Principes”, ed. Philippe de Rouilhan). a long nose, say: ‘When I speak of noses, I except such as are inordinately long’, which would not be a very successful eTort to avoid a painful topic.”1 Poincaré maintained that one should exclude the oTending cases and therebyavoid“viciouscircles”ofself-referencewhichgenerateparadoxes. Russell objected: We may illustrate this by what M. Poincaré says concerning Richard’s paradox. Having Wrst put E = “all numbers deWnable in a Wnite number of words” we arrive at a paradox, due, says M. Poincaré, to our having included a number only deWnable in a Wnite number of words by means of E. This vicious circle he proposes to avoid by deWning E as “all numbers deWnable in a Wnite number of words without mentioning Ey”. To the uninitiated, this deWnition looks more circular than ever.2 Russell held that some paradoxes such as those of classes require, in order to exclude oTending cases without mentioning them, a “reconstruction of logical Wrst principles”. Others, such as Richard’s, are to be dismissed because they involve confused and viciously circular notions of “deWnability ”.3 Is self-reference necessary for paradoxes? The question is not well crafted. There are quite diTerent notions ofz “self-reference” involved in paradoxes. The self-reference involved in the Liar “This sentence is false” is provided by an apparatus of indexicals. This apparatus is quite distinct from the self-reference involved in Russell’s early ontology of propositions (as mind- and language-independent states of aTairs). This is an ontological self... (shrink)

Political liberals on the left (e.g., Rawls) and right (e.g., Nozick) have long been concerned with the moral justification of coercive legal structures. I argue that anyone who publicly advocates a new coercive law is under a moral duty to those whom the law might negatively affect. The duty is to say that the law would be impactful and why its impacts (e.g., its coerciveness and welfare effects) are worth having all-things-considered. This is a defeasible duty of transparency and disclosure. (...) By doing their duty, citizens would better respect each other and even transform public discourse as we know it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:An Unconscious Dimension of Thinking, Situations, and La Vida:Reflections on Bethany Henning's Dewey and the Aesthetic UnconsciousGregory Pappasthis book is doing different related and valuable things. First, Bethany Henning explores a neglected dimension of Dewey's thought. In particular, the book inquires into the dimension of the unconscious and tries to develop what she considers an "implicit" "theory of the unconsciousness" or of the "aesthetic unconscious" in Dewey's philosophy. Then, (...) based on all of the above, it provides a diagnosis and possible solution to a problem with philosophers and with American culture.The neglected dimension of Dewey's thought that Henning explores highlights the ways in which Dewey foresaw what feminist thinkers have said, and recent scientific accounts of human life and thinking are confirming: What we "feel" (what is "qualitative," "ineffable," and "noncognitive") is key to how to think and how to live (guidance and meaning). It has therefore been puzzling to me (along with John McDermott, Tom Alexander, Mark Johnson, and a few others) why even Dewey scholarship has to a large extent neglected exploring this aspect of his thought. Frustrated with Bertrand Russell, Dewey says that "Mr. Russell has not been able to follow the distinction I make between the immediately had material of non-cognitively experienced situations and the material of cognition—a distinction without which my view cannot be understood" (LW 14:33; emphasis added).More importantly, by neglecting this insight and these aspects of his thought, we have failed to utilize one of the most important resources to diagnose sociopolitical-moral problems today! This is what I have been trying to do in recent years, and I see Dr. Henning as trying to do the same. She is not just providing a theory of the unconscious for the sake of speculation, but she does so with instrumental intent, in the hope that it will help us better approach a concrete social-cultural problem we suffer in our society, a topic to which I will return. [End Page 84]My reading of Dewey and the Aesthetic Unconscious has provoked a few questions:(a). Is there, in Dewey, a conception of aesthetic and religious experience that can be understood as an "implicit theory of the unconscious"?(b). Even if there is one, do we need one? For what purpose?(c). What would we miss if we were to say what needs to be said and explored by Henning by using different terms/concepts and avoiding the possible misunderstanding and dangers of making reference to "the unconscious"?(d). Would Henning agree that the problematic aversion or repression in American culture that concerns us is more than that of the unconscious, the qualitative, body, and nature that form the focus of her book?(e). Henning agrees that we need more than art and "deep" psychology to ameliorate the problems that concern us. What is this "more"? How?In regard to (b), I can think of one good purpose, which Henning develops in Dewey and the Aesthetic Unconscious: to engage in a dialogue with psychoanalysis and contemporary philosophies that draw from psychoanalysis and feminism (e.g., Kristeva) or, in general, other academics concerned with the same problems. I also wondered as I was reading the book why Henning does not put Carl Jung in dialogue with Dewey as well, just as a matter of curiosity. But I wonder, if we need to develop a "theory of the unconsciousness" or of the "aesthetic unconsciousness" to both make a contribution to the "depth" of lived experience (La Vida) and also deal with the social-cultural problems that concern us.There are dangers with talking about or making reference to "the" unconsciousness or "the" aesthetic unconsciousness and theorizing about them. The problem is that it comes across as a noun, and not as way of participating in La Vida or nature, that is continuous in a significant way with what is more conscious and more cognitive: we are at any time more or less conscious. But Henning seems aware of all of this. She is careful enough to make clear that she is acknowledging continuity, but I confess to "feeling" uncomfortable sometimes with her reference to that... (shrink)

Gregory S. Moss examines the central arguments in Ernst Cassirer’s first volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms to show how Cassirer defends language as an autonomous cultural form, and how he borrows the concept of the “concrete universal” from G. W. F. Hegel in order to develop a concept of cultural autonomy.

From their relative obscurity over the past three decades, varied strains of Ebola disease have emerged as a substantial global biothreat. The current outbreak of Ebola, beginning in March 2014 in Guinea, is projected to infect tens of thousands of people before being brought under control. Some estimate the outbreak could exceed 100,000 cases and extend another 12-18 months. Ebola’s spread has the potential to extend across the globe, but is concentrated in several African countries. Collectively, these countries are home (...) to nearly 290 million people. Among Liberia’s population of 4.1 million, over 1,100 people have already died from Ebola in less than 6 months; by comparison, if this same outbreak and death rate occurred in the United States, over 88,000 Americans would perish. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL TO FREGE, 24 MAY 1903: "I BELIEVE I HAVE DISCOVERED THAT CLASSES ARE ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS" GREGORY LANDINI Philosophy / University of Iowa Iowa City, IA 52242, USA It was his consideration of Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal, Russell recalls in My Philosophical Development, that led in the spring of 1901 to the discovery of the paradox of the class of all classes not members (...) of themselves. "Never glad confident morning again", were Whitehead's reported words (MPD, p. 58). Whitehead was, of course, wrong. Russell had many new confident mornings. One in particular apparently occurred on 19 May 1903. On 23 May Russell wrote in his journal: "Four days ago 1 solved the Contradiction -the relief of this is unspeakable" (Papm 12: 24). The "solution" was communicated to Whitehead, who responded by telegram: "Heartiest congratulations Aristoteles secundus. 1 am delighted" (Clark, p. III). But it was not long before Russell knew his proposal was inadequate. On the form he would scrawl: "A propos of solVing the Contradiction. [But the solution was wrong]" (ibid; Russell's brackets). The episode is intriguing. What was the proposal? Russell's correspondence with Frege sheds some light. On 20 October 1902 Frege had sent a letter suggesting a way to avoid the contradiction. Frege's suggestion, formulated in a great hurry so that it might appear in the Appendix of Vol. II of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, was to abandon his Basic Law V; zcj>z =zez. ==. (x)(x. ==. ex), and to replace it by Russell to Frege, 24 May I903 161 V' zz =zez. ==. (x)(x *zz & x* zez: ~ : x. ==. ex). The underlying idea was to accept that one concept may have the same extension as another even though the two concepts are not coextensive. Though he thought the underlying idea "probably correct",! Russell expressed reservation in a reply of 12 December:... I find it difficult to accept your solution even though it is probably correct. Do you deny, e.g., that all classes form a class? And if this is admitted, then it is possible that - ana. Moreover, the class of non-humans is a. non-human. Otherwise it must be admitted that not ail objects fall either under a or not-a; namely, if a is a range of values, then a fails neither under a nor under not-a. This contradicts the law of excluded middle, which will be inconvenient to say the least.2 (Frege I980, p. 151) Frege's response of 28 December does not mention the contradiction, and Volume II of his Grundgesetze appeared early in 1903. Russell's reservations concerning Frege's solution· continue in a letter to Frege of 20 February 1903: What you say about my contradiction is of the greatest interest to me. Do you believe that the range of values remains unchanged if some subclass of the class is assigned to it as a new member? Extension seems to fit this view better than intension. Bur I fe;el far from clear about this question. (Frege I980, p. 155) Frege replied on 21 May, explaining that in general a class does not remain unchanged when a particular subclass is added to it, but that two concepts may have the same extension (the same class) when the only difference between them is that this class falls under the first concept but not under the second (p. 157). Then on 24 May 1903 Russell excitedly wrote Frege of a solution of the paradox of classes: "I received your letter this morning, and 1 am replying to it at once, for russell: the Journal of the Berrrand Russdl Archives McMasrer University Library Press n.S.•2 (wincer 1992-93): 160-85 ISSN 0036-01631 • The same evaluation appears in Russell's Appendix to The Principles ofMathematics (p. 522). 2 Frege's '\- a II b" is Peano and Russell's "a E b". Russell should have put "~ana". 162 GREGORY LANDINI I believe I have discovered that classes are entirely superfluous. Your designation i(z) can be used for itself, and x E i(z) for (x).... this seems to me to avoid the contradiction" (p. 159). The proposal is also mentioned in a... (shrink)

continent. 1.2 (2011): 145-147. Here I accoutred myself in my new habiliments; and, having em- ployed the same precautions as before, retired from my lodging at a time least exposed to observation. It is unnecessary to des- cribe the particulars of my new equipage; suffice it to say, that one of my cares was to discolour my complexion, and give it the dun and sallow hue which is in most instances characteristic of the tribe to which I assumed to belong; (...) and that when my metamorphosis was finished, I could not, upon the strictest ex- amination, conceive that any one could have traced out the per- son of Caleb Williams in this new disguise. William Godwin Caleb Williams (352). Giorgio Agamben. Nudities . Trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. 144 pp. | 10 illustrations. | ISBN: 9780804769501 | $16.95 A. The Protective Overcoat. The most pervasive, resilient, robust, sneaky, and significant concept in all of Giorgio Agamben’s essays is that of separation. This is not the same as alienation. Separation is more nostalgic, for Agamben valorizes an ancient world in which human society and its beings were not subject to such separation. He implies that these separations are damaging to human beings, crippling them at the very level of their identities. $4.99 B. The Handsome Gloves. Giorgio Agamben’s Nudities , like Profanations before it, employs a wide range of subjects in order to establish separation as a metaphor, in much the same way that interdisciplinary scholars have adopted Michel Foucault’s concepts in order to rethink societies and texts. The longest essay from Profanations, entitled “In Praise of Profanation,” laments humankind’s inability to profane as the result of what Walter Benjamin has called “the capitalist religion.” Likewise, “Nudity” adopts a pessimistic stance on the Christian theological tradition’s perverse asphyxiation of the unclothed body. $2.50 C. The Hoop Earrings. Religion separates humans from things by procuring for itself items as “sacred,” thus taking them out of common use. In this state, human beings are unable to play with them, unable to change their use-value. They become off-limits, museified. $1,499.00 D. The Uncomfortable Shoes. Biometrics polices identity, replacing meaningful metrics of identity. It is a deplorable situation that leaves human beings in danger of, and indeed already victims of, mass persecution. $111.75 E. The Prince Albert. One could characterize Giorgio Agamben’s desire to catalogue a history of ignorance as a recognition that human beings are separated from knowledge by language. Where then is the prophet, and how shall we be saved? $49.50 + tip F. The Corset. Franz Kafka’s character of Joseph K. has put himself on trial, as in Roman trials when the Kalumniator was marked with the letter K. The torture he undergoes is meant to elicit a confession of the truth. It is possible that Giorgio Agamben perceives his role as a philosopher to be confined to self-trial, and that with every passage he flays the unclothed page with prophetic intent. $27.00 G. The Derby. Giorgio Agamben himself tries to bridge various separations through exploratory play. He is not a performative writer semantically, but his exploratory style is rooted in the play spirit. His strategy of numbering points is almost comical, yet it is not misleading. It is play, after all, not ruse. He denudes with pecks, like carrion on a tattered corpse. $11.00 H. The Trousers. Although Giorgio Agamben is elsewhere concerned with the profanation of religion’s apparatuses, in essay nine he would like to consider what is consumed during days of inoperativity, how religion governs these, and how to account for our binges and purges. Inoperativity is inextricably bound to feasting, to the festival. $24.50 I. The Stylish Belt. The only essay in Nudities to contain photographs is the essay entitled, “Nudity.” All of these photographs project human bodies. $.01 I The aim here is not to tap into an original state prior to the separation but to comprehend and neutralize the apparatus that produced this separation. (66) II The contemporary is he who firmly holds his gaze on his own time so as to perceive not its light but rather its darkness. (13) III We can therefore only experience nudity as a denudation and a baring, never as a form and a stable possession. (65) IV Just as genius and talent originally distinct and even opposite—are nevertheless united in the work of the poet, so the work of creation and the work of salvation, inasmuch as they represent the two powers of a single God, remain in some way secretly conjoined. (6) V In our culture, the face-body relationship is marked by a fundamental asymmetry, in that our faces remain for the most part naked, while our bodies are normally covered. (88) VI Every man initiates a slanderous trial against himself. (21) VII The glorious body is not some other body, more agile and beautiful, more luminous and spiritual; it is the body itself, at the moment when inoperativity removes the spell from it and opens it up to a new possible common use. (103) VIII As Kleist understood so well, the relationship with a zone of nonknowledge is a dance. (114) IX The deactivation of this apparatus retroactively operates, therefore, as much on nature as on grace, as much on nudity as on clothing, liberating them from their theological signature. (90) X At any rate, whether festive inoperativity precedes religion or results from the profanation of its apparatuses, what is essential here is a dimension of praxis in which simple, quotidian human activities are neither negated nor abolished but suspended and rendered inoperative in order to be exhibited, as such, in a festive manner. (112) XI This is just how much [of] the land [the] surveyor is allowed to catch a glimpse. (36). (shrink)

In society, power and responsibility are often linked, supporting the idea that with great power comes great responsibility. I assert that this link between power and responsibility is a form of the Act–Omission Distinction, a principle in ethics that there is a morally relevant distinction between doing something and omitting to do something, e.g. a difference between killing someone and letting someone be killed. As such, using trolleys, elected spider-men, and real-life cases such as R v Stone & Dobinson, I (...) contest this casual relationship between power and responsibility and argue the relationship to be correlative as both power and responsibility are often simultaneously caused by consent.Export citation. (shrink)

The book will prove an invaluable source for philosophers and philosophy students, as well as for scholars from other disciplines (e.g., history, political science, sociology, diversity studies, and gender and race studies) to begin understanding the dynamic relationship in thinking between the two Americas. In addition to documenting the results of a new and thriving area of research, it can also function as a primer to direct and provoke further inquiry. -/- Its essays, from North American, Spanish, and Latin American (...) scholars, fill a void in the humanities and introduce a number of Hispanic pragmatists who have not been included in standard pragmatist texts. (shrink)

This study identifies and describes the values espoused by the 62 companies that have consistently appeared on the “Fortune 100 Best Companies to Work For” list. We identify 24 separate values and offer an analysis of the keywords and phrases used to promote them. We confirm that these values fall within the categories of four well-accepted theoretical frameworks of corporate values and culture. We then provide evidence for three underlying dimensions transcending all four models. They are values that guide relationships (...) and self-regulation; values that describe desired outcomes and performance; and values that inform learning and change. Next, we present the results of a qualitative study describing how these companies put their values into practice. Finally, using publicly available information from the Great Place to Work® Institute, we show how the espoused values we identified relate to: what employees report about their experiences and company self-descriptions. Our findings highlight connections between leadership and values and they offer guidance to those seeking to understand keys to values-based cultures. (shrink)

In this essay I pay homage to one of the most important but neglected philosophers of liberation in Latin America, Luis Villoro, by considering what possible lessons we can learn from his philosophy about how to approach injustices in the Americas. Villoro was sympathetic to liberatory-leftist philosophies but he became concerned with the direction they took once they grew into philosophical movements centered on shared beliefs or on totalizing theories that presume global explanatory power. These movements became vulnerable to extremes (...) or vices that undermine their liberatory promise. I examine some of these worrying tendencies among that body of literature roughly described as “decolonial thought” (e.g., Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo). After a concise presentation of Villoro and the decolonial turn, I consider four dangers that this new liberatory-leftist movement faces and why Villoro should be a significant voice as the decoloniality debate moves forward. (shrink)

As more and more firms operate globally, an understanding of the effects of cultural differences on ethical decision making becomes increasingly important for avoiding potential business pitfalls and for designing effective international marketing management programs. Although several articles have addressed this area in general, differences along specific, cultural dimensions have not been directly examined. Hence, the purpose of this study was to examine differences in ethical decision making within Hofstede's cultural framework. The results confirm the utility of Hofstede's cultural dimensions (...) and place ethical decision making within an overall theoretical framework. Sales agents from a high power distance, uncertainty avoidant, Confucian, collectivist culture (i.e., Taiwan) placed more value on company and fellow employee interests (vis-à-vis self interests) than did managers from a masculine, individualistic culture (i.e., the United States). American and Taiwanese managers did not differ in their deontological norms or on the importance that they placed on customer interests. The theoretical and managerial importance of these findings are also discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52
eviews WITTGENSTEIN APPROACHED G L Philosophy / U. of Iowa Iowa City,  ,  -@. Brian McGuinness. Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers. London and New York: Routledge, . Pp. xv, . .. his book is a joy to read. Brian McGuinness is among the foremost Tscholars of Wittgenstein’s life and work. For better than  years, his papers have given (...) perhaps the most clear and authoritative account of the complex intellectual and personal journey of Wittgenstein. The collection of these important papers in one book is an outstanding gift to all who are interested in early analytic philosophy. The papers are not presented diachronically, but topically, starting with McGuinness’s discussions of the interplay between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his conception of himself, as Austrian patriot, as teacher, as Jew, as architect, as penitent. There is much controversy in all of this. It is upsetting to learn that Wittgenstein remarked (likely sometime shortly after the events of Pearl Harbor in ) that “Things will be terrible when the war is over, whoever wins. Of course very terrible if the Nazis won, but terribly slimy if the Allies win” (p. ). In spite of McGuinness’s attempts at charitable explanation, it is hard to excuse this remark. Wittgenstein should have recognized that it was imperative that the Allies win, for surely he could not, by then, have been blind to the pogroms of Nazism (if not the implementation of their Final Solution to the Jewish question). It is just disappointing to discover Wittgenstein’s dalliance with anti-Semitism or with Weininger’s deplorable Sex and Gender. Nonetheless, McGuinness offers a wonderful and balanced portrait of Wittgenstein with a welcome minimum of hyperbole either concerning his genius, achievements and influences, or his eccentricities and failings.  As also in McGuinness’s Wittgenstein, a Life: Young Ludwig (London: Duckworth, and Berkeley : U. of California P., ; reprinted as Young Ludwig: Wittgenstein’s Life, – with a new Preface [Oxford: Clarendon P., ]) russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.  (winter –): – The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.  - _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52  Reviews In a second part, the book delves into the origins and nature of Wittgenstein ’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Since the papers in this part do not come diachronically, it would be nice for each to have a date by its title, so that if there is an historical development of McGuinness’s ideas it could be more easily tracked. But evolving or not, the interpretations in McGuinness’s papers are of the very highest quality. I know of no one else who has come closer to unravelling the often cryptic entries in the Tractatus. Though some of McGuinness’s assumptions about Russell’s philosophy are now challenged by new interpretations —in particular, it seems that Russell never held a theory of types of entities —there remain a great many gems in these papers. Among them are the following: Wittgenstein’s conception of solipsism is not Cartesian and epistemic, but concerns the limits of logical form and the proper ethical attitude towards life (p. ); the Notes on Logic were offered as satisfying the dissertation requirement for Wittgenstein’s .. degree (p. ); Wittgenstein included among the “logical constants” such notions as that of a “predicate” and a “dual complex”, not just logical particles such as “not”, “or”, “all” and “some” (p. ); Wittgenstein’s Grundgedanke was independent of his “picture theory” (p. ); Wittgenstein’s “logical atomism” was to be a purified form of Russell’s so that it forms “true logical atomism” with no differences of type and with the unification provided by neutral monism of mental and physical particulars (p. ); Wittgenstein and Russell had similar attractions to Spinozistic ethics, the conception of the world sub specie aeternitatis and the “mystical” as what inspires the scientific attitude (pp. , ); Hertz’s elimination of the concept of “force” in physics was an inspiration for Wittgenstein’s elimination of “classes”, “probability”, and the logical constants (p. ); structured variables were central to Wittgenstein’s Tractarian programme (p. ); Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical analysis has important ties to Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm (pp. , , ). These... (shrink)

Statistical Default Logic (SDL) is an expansion of classical (i.e., Reiter) default logic that allows us to model common inference patterns found in standard inferential statistics, e.g., hypothesis testing and the estimation of a population‘s mean, variance and proportions. This paper presents an embedding of an important subset of SDL theories, called literal statistical default theories, into stable model semantics. The embedding is designed to compute the signature set of literals that uniquely distinguishes each extension on a statistical default theory (...) at a pre-assigned error-bound probability. (shrink)

Models of recognition memory have traditionally struggled with the puzzle of criterion setting, a problem that is particularly acute in cases in which items for study and test are of widely varying types, with differing degrees of baseline familiarity and experience (e.g., words vs. random dot patterns). We present a dynamic model of the recognition process that addresses the criterion setting problem and produces joint predictions for choice and reaction time. In this model, recognition decisions are based not on the (...) absolute value of familiarity, but on how familiarity changes over time as features are sampled from the test item. Decisions are the outcome of a race between two parallel accumulators: one that accumulates positive changes in familiarity (leading to an ‘‘old’’ decision) and another that accumulates negative changes (leading to a ‘‘new’’ decision). Simulations with this model make realistic predictions for recognition performance and latency regardless of the baseline familiarity of study and test items. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that the traditional concept of universality entails three dogmas, the validity of which have seldom been called into question. To each of these dogmas correspond to common commitments to the universal in the Western tradition. I argue that the only legitimate answer to the question ‘what is the universal?’ requires abandoning the three dogmas of universality and the entailments that follow from them. Moreover, the question ‘what is the universal?’ requires that we adopt self-reference into (...) our concept of the universal, a feature rarely allowed to be predicated of the universal in contemporary and classical Analytic philosophy yet required if any progress on the question ‘what is universality?’ may be had. If my argument is successful, philosophers have an obligation to investigate the work of G.W.F. Hegel more closely, since he is the only philosopher in the rationalist tradition to properly identify these dogmas and think a concept of the universal that avoids the pitfalls that follow from their adoption. (shrink)

The concept of mimesis has been central to philosophical aesthetics from Aristotle to Kendall Walton: in plain terms, it highlights the links between a fictional world or a representational practice on the one hand and the real world on the other. The present collection of essays includes discussions of its general viability and pertinence and of its historical origins, as well as detailed analyses of various relevant issues regarding literature, film, theatre, images and computer games. The individual papers offer new (...) arguments for the specialist, yet in their sum also provide a solid and helpful survey of the current state of the debate. Contributions by P. Alward, G. Currie, D. Davies, L. Dole el, J. Hamilton, T. Kobli ek, P. Kot'atko, A. Kuzmicova, J. Levinson, A. Meskin, A. Pettersson, M. Pokorny, J. Robson, G. Rossholm, R. M. Sainsbury, F. Stjernberg, E. Terrone, K. Thein, A. Voltolini. (shrink)

While Žižek is right to assert both that Heidegger’s political engagement must be confronted as a genuine philosophical challenge and that our modern predicament demands new thinking, I argue that Žižek is wrong to claim that Heidegger made the right step in 1933, even if in the wrong direction. Using the same story as Žižek, G. K. Chesterton’s “The Sign of the Broken Sword,” I argue that Žižek’s sword is also broken, because in the absence of a “big Other,” it (...) is not possible to give an orientation or direction for political action. Furthermore, given that absence, I claim that Žižek’s call for an enthusiastic politics that merges self with society is particularly dangerous: rather than fulfill a Dionysian moment in politics, it threatens to unleash what I call a priapic politics. I end by suggesting that Žižek’s argument heralds the death of the binary distinction between “Left” and “Right,” and I argue for a return to a politics of prudence. (shrink)

The question of this work is the relationship between cognition and self-knowledge. That question is approached both by way of Kant on apperception and from the perspective of contemporary theories of mind which locate the origin of our cognitive life in interpersonal, interpretive practices, e.g., Sellars, Davidson, Dennett and Brandom. Kant does not integrate the social dimension into his account of cognition. In fact, many of his arguments for the apperception principle are beholden to a picture of mind which precludes (...) his recognizing the social dimension of cognition. Nonetheless, one can reconstruct a Kantian argument for the apperception principle within the framework of a theory which recognizes the constitutive role of interpretation in cognition. ;Chapter One explores the various ways that the priority of interpersonal interpretation has been claimed. These range from analyses of our talk of the mind as descriptive-predictive strategies to functionalist theories of mind to theories which emphasize the connection between interpreting language and attributing propositional attitudes and the normative dimension of interpretation . Chapter Two outlines seven interpretive questions that any reading of Kant on apperception must address, questions about what Kant means by 'apperception' and the character of the apperception principle. Chapter Three is an analysis of those Kantian arguments for the apperception principle which picture the mind as a private arena, arguments which are untenable from the perspective established in Chapter One. Chapter Four explores Sydney Shoemaker's argument for a functionalist version of Kant's apperception principle and argues that his approach is unsatisfactory. Chapter Five introduces Robert Brandom's theory of propositional attitudes with a discussion of Sellars' theory of sentence meaning and Davidson on the relationship between belief and meaning. Chapter Six then looks at what difference the ability to attribute oneself a propositional attitude might make on Brandom's theory. I argue against Brandom that having a belief or an intention presupposes the ability to explicitly say that one has that belief or intention. Chapter Seven returns to Kant and argues that the analysis and conclusion of Chapter Six are broadly Kantian. (shrink)

A fundamental characteristic of human visual perception is the ability to group together disparate elements in a scene and treat them as a single unit. The mechanisms by which humans create such groupings remain unknown, but grouping seems to play an important role in a wide variety of visual phenomena, and a good understanding of these mechanisms might provide guidance for how to improve machine vision algorithms. Here, we build on a proposal that some groupings are the result of connections (...) in cortical area V2 that join disparate elements, thereby allowing them to be selected and segmented together. In previous instantiations of this proposal, connection formation was based on the anatomy (e.g., extent) of receptive fields, which made connection formation obligatory when the stimulus conditions stimulate the corresponding receptive fields. We now propose dynamic circuits that provide greater flexibility in the formation of connections and that allow for top-down control of perceptual grouping. With computer simulations we explain how the circuits work and show how they can account for a wide variety of Gestalt principles of perceptual grouping, texture segmentation tasks, amodal illusory contours, and ratings of perceived groupings. We propose that human observers use such top-down control to implement task-dependent connection strategies that encourage particular groupings of stimulus elements in order to promote performance on various visual tasks. (shrink)

In this paper the following theorem is proved regarding groups of finite Morley rank which are perfect central extensions of quasisimple algebraic groups.Theorem1.Let G be a perfect group of finite Morley rank and let C0be a definable central subgroup of G such that G/C0is a universal linear algebraic group over an algebraically closed field; that is G is a perfect central extension of finite Morley rank of a universal linear algebraic group. Then C0= 1.Contrary to an impression which exists in (...) some circles, the center of the universal extension of a simple algebraic group, as an abstract group, is not finite in general. Thus the finite Morley rank assumption cannot be omitted.Corollary1.Let G be a perfect group of finite Morley rank such that G/Z(G) is a quasisimple algebraic group. Then G is an algebraic group. In particular, Z(G) is finite([4],Section27.5).An understanding of central extensions of quasisimple linear algebraic groups which are groups of finite Morley rank is necessary for the classification oftamesimpleK*-groupsof finite Morley rank, which constitutes an approach to the Cherlin-Zil’ber conjecture. For this reason the theorem above and its corollary were proven in [1] (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) under the assumption oftameness, which simplifies the argument considerably. The result of the present paper shows that this assumption can be dropped. The main line of argument is parallel to that in [1]; the absence of the tameness assumption will be countered by a model-theoretic result and results fromK-theory. The model-theoretic result places limitations on definability in stable fields, and may possibly be relevant to eliminating certain other uses of tameness. (shrink)

Knowledge of pedagogy and social studies content influences a teacher's decision making and helps teachers conduct sound instructional practices despite the influence of high-stakes testing policies. Using national data from the Survey of the Status of Social Studies (S4), this study examined the associations of teachers’ professional characteristics, school environmental factors, and state testing policy on self-reported levels of authority that secondary level social studies teachers (grades 6–12) hold over key classroom tasks. Through hierarchical multiple regression analysis, key findings from (...) this study indicated that greater minority enrollments are associated with lower levels of instructional authority. Teachers who worked in states where a state-mandated social studies test was administered reported less freedom to choose what to teach and how to teach than those in non-testing states. Also, this study showed that in-field status, the type of licensure, and years of teaching experience are important factors in exercising social studies teachers’ instructional authority (e.g., their ability to balance effectively the demands of state-mandated reforms with teaching for meaningful student learning). This study recommends that schools with high minority enrollments, especially if these districts exist in a high stakes testing environment, should invest in teachers with high-quality social studies preparation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Scientists played a key role in the first systematic introduction of nature study into North American public schools in the late nineteenth century. The initiatives of Wilbur Jackman and John Merle Coulter, affiliated with the young University of Chicago, and Liberty Hyde Bailey and Anna Botsford Comstock, at Cornell University, coincided with the “new education” reform movement that found object lessons and experience‐based education superior to textbook teaching. Educational psychologists and philosophers of the 1890s, including G. Stanley Hall, related (...) curriculum methods to perceived developmental stages in children, with a focus on immediate experience. Putting these pedagogical ideas—gained in summer institutes, normal schools, and programs at Chicago and Cornell—into practice were administrators and classroom teachers in both urban and rural classrooms. By 1900, a consensus about the value of nature study among scientists, community leaders, and teachers established it as the recognized general method of studying the natural world in public schools across much of the United States. (shrink)

Intellectual humility, which entails openness to other views and a willingness to listen and engage with them, is crucial for facilitating civil dialogue and progress in debate between opposing sides. In the present research, we tested whether intellectual humility can be reliably detected in discourse and experimentally increased by a prior self-affirmation task. Three-hundred and three participants took part in 116 audio and video-recorded group discussions. Blind to condition, linguists coded participants’ discourse to create an intellectual humility score. As expected, (...) the self-affirmation task increased the coded intellectual humility, as well as participants’ self-rated prosocial affect (e.g., empathy). Unexpectedly, the effect on prosocial affect did not mediate the link between experimental condition and intellectual humility in debate. Self-reported intellectual humility and other personality variables were uncorrelated with expert-coded intellectual humility. Implications of these findings for understanding the social psychological mechanisms underpinning intellectual humility are considered. (shrink)

Recent times have seen increasing interest in conversational assistants (e.g., Amazon Alexa) designed to help users in their daily tasks. In military settings, it is critical to design assistants that are, simultaneously, helpful and able to minimize the user’s cognitive load. Here we show that embodiment plays a key role in achieving that goal. We present an experiment where participants engaged in the desert survival task in augmented reality. Participants were paired with a voice assistant, an embodied assistant, or no (...) assistant. The assistants made suggestions verbally throughout the task, whereas the embodied assistant further used gestures and emotion to communicate with the user. Our results indicate that both assistant conditions led to higher performance over the no assistant condition, but the embodied assistant achieved this with less cognitive burden on the decision maker than the non-embodied assistant. We discuss implications for the design of intelligent collaborative systems for the warfighter. (shrink)

We present a population density and moment-based description of the stochastic dynamics of domain $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ -mediated inactivation of L-type $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ channels. Our approach accounts for the effect of heterogeneity of local $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ signals on whole cell $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ currents; however, in contrast with prior work, e.g., Sherman et al. :985–995, 1990), we do not assume that $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ domain formation and collapse are fast compared to channel gating. We demonstrate the population density and moment-based modeling approaches using a 12-state Markov chain model (...) of an L-type $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ channel introduced by Greenstein and Winslow :2918–2945, 2002). Simulated whole cell voltage clamp responses yield an inactivation function for the whole cell $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ current that agrees with the traditional approach when domain dynamics are fast. We analyze the voltage-dependence of $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ inactivation that may occur via slow heterogeneous domain [ $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ ]. Next, we find that when channel permeability is held constant, $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ -mediated inactivation of L-type channels increases as the domain time constant increases, because a slow domain collapse rate leads to increased mean domain [ $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ ] near open channels; conversely, when the maximum domain [ $${\text{Ca}}^{2+}$$ ] is held constant, inactivation decreases as the domain time constant increases. Comparison of simulation results using population densities and moment equations confirms the computational efficiency of the moment-based approach, and enables the validation of two distinct methods of truncating and closing the open system of moment equations. In general, a slow domain time constant requires higher order moment truncation for agreement between moment-based and population density simulations. (shrink)

In relation to a thesis put forward by Marx Wartofsky, we seek to show that a historiography of mathematics requires an analysis of the ontology of the part of mathematics under scrutiny. Following Ian Hacking, we point out that in the history of mathematics the amount of contingency is larger than is usually thought. As a case study, we analyze the historians’ approach to interpreting James Gregory’s expression ultimate terms in his paper attempting to prove the irrationality of \. (...) Here Gregory referred to the last or ultimate terms of a series. More broadly, we analyze the following questions: which modern framework is more appropriate for interpreting the procedures at work in texts from the early history of infinitesimal analysis? As well as the related question: what is a logical theory that is close to something early modern mathematicians could have used when studying infinite series and quadrature problems? We argue that what has been routinely viewed from the viewpoint of classical analysis as an example of an “unrigorous” practice, in fact finds close procedural proxies in modern infinitesimal theories. We analyze a mix of social and religious reasons that had led to the suppression of both the religious order of Gregory’s teacher degli Angeli, and Gregory’s books at Venice, in the late 1660s. (shrink)

Vlastos, G. Introduction: the paradox of Socrates.--Lacey, A. R. Our knowledge of Socrates.--Dover, K. J. Socrates in the Clouds.--Robinson, R. Elenchus.--Robinson, R. Elenchus, direct and indirect.--Robinson, R. Socratic definition.--Nakhnikian, G. Elenctic definitions.--Cohen, S. M. Socrates on the definition of piety: Euthyphro 10A-11B.--Santas, G. Socrates at work on virtue and knowledge in Plato's Laches.--Burnyeat, M. F. Virtues in action.--Walsh, J. J. The Socratic denial of Akrasia.--Santas, G. Plato's Protagoras and explanations of weakness.--Woozley, A. D. Socrates on disobeying the law.--Allen, R. E. (...) Plato's earlier theory of forms. (shrink)

The publication of Daniel Lehrman’s 1953 paper, “A Critique of Konrad Lorenz’s Theory of Instinctive Behavior,” (_The Quarterly Review of Biology_ 28(4):337–363) exposed a gulf between comparative psychologists and ethologists regarding the concept of instincts. At the center of this debate was a rivalry between T. C. Schneirla—Lehrman’s doctoral advisor—and Konrad Lorenz. While Schneirla maintained that the concept of innate instincts mischaracterized developmental processes, Lorenz maintained that innateness was essential to understand the evolution of behavior. A year after the publication (...) of Lehrman’s paper, the Singer-Polignac Foundation organized a small conference where leaders in evolutionary biology, ethology, behavioral physiology, and comparative psychology met to discuss the concept of instinct and innateness. The result of this meeting was the publication of the book _L’instinct dans le comportement des animaux et de l’homme_ (M. Autuori et al. ( 1956 ) Masson, Paris) in which each conference participant submitted a chapter that was followed by a discussion among the participants. Here I review the historical context surrounding this conference with a republishing of the commentary on Schneirla’s chapter, “Interrelationships of the ‘Innate’ and the ‘Acquired’ in Instinctive Behavior.” Originally published in English, German, and French, the discussion is included here with a new translation into English for the first time. A companion article (this issue; G. M. Kohn (2024) “Revisiting T. C. Schneirla’s ‘Interrelationships of the “Innate” and the “Acquired” in Instinctive Behavior’ (1956)”) discusses and makes available Schneirla’s complete paper. (shrink)